We consider players that have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player i has about the profile of true valuations, θ * , consists of a set of distributions, from one of which θ * i has been drawn. We prove a "robustness" theorem for Knightian players in single-parameter domains: every mechanism that is weakly dominant-strategy truthful for classical players continues to be well-behaved for Knightian players that choose undominated strategies.
Introduction
In [CMZ14] we motivate the problem of mechanism design for Knightian players, and prove that (1) dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-good and multi-unit auctions cannot provide good social-welfare efficiency, but (2) the second-price and Vickrey mechanisms deliver good social-welfare performance, for these two settings, in undominated strategies.
In this report, we prove a "robustness" theorem for single-parameter domains.
Namely, consider a mechanism M for a single-parameter domain and suppose that M , when players have perfect information about their own valuations, is weakly dominant-strategy truthful. Now consider the same mechanism M , but with Knightian players that, not having any dominant strategy to play, choose to play undominated strategies. We prove that the set of undominated strategies is well-behaved, in the sense that these strategies do not deviate from the players' approximate information about his own valuation.
Model
In a classical single-parameter domain, there is a set A, the set of all possible allocations; for each player i there exists a publicly known subset S i ⊆ A; and the set of possible valuations for player i, Θ i , consists of all functions mapping A to the reals, subject to the following constraints: for each
We denote the true valuation of player i by θ * i . (The term "single-parameter" derives from the fact that each θ i ∈ Θ i coincides with a single number: i's value for, say, the lexicographically first element of S i . The term "classical" emphasizes that each player knows exactly his own true valuation.)
The set of possible outcomes is Ω def = A×R n ≥0 . If (A, P ) ∈ Ω, we refer P i as the price charged to player i. We assume quasi-linear utilities. That is, the utility function U i of a player i maps a valuation θ i and an outcome ω = (A, P ) to
If ω is a distribution over outcomes, we also denote by U i (θ i , ω) the expected utility of player i.
Single-parameter domains are general enough to include several settings of interest: in particular, provision of a public good 1 [Cla71] , bilateral trades [MS83] , and buying a path in a network [NR01] .
Knightian Valuation Uncertainty
In our model, a player i's sole information about θ * consists of K i , a set of distributions over Θ i , from one of which θ * i has been drawn. (The true valuations are uncorrelated.) That is, K i is i's sole (and private) information about his own true valuation θ * i . Furthermore, for every opponent j, i has no information (or beliefs) about θ * j or K j . Given that all he cares about is his expected (quasi-linear) utility, a player i may
2 Therefore, for single-parameter domains, a mathematically equivalent formulation of the Knightian valuation model is the following:
Definition 2.1 (Knightian valuation model). For each player i, i's sole information about θ * is a set K i , the candidate (valuation) set of i, such that θ * i ∈ K i ⊂ Θ i . We refer to an element of K i as a candidate valuation.
In Knightian valuation model, a mechanism's performance will of course depend on the inaccuracy of the players' candidate sets, which we measure as follows. General mechanisms and strategies. A mechanism M specifies, for each player i, a set S i . We interchangeably refer to each member of S i as a pure strategy/action/report of i, and similarly, a member of ∆(S i ) a mixed strategy/action/report of i.
After each player i, simultaneously with his opponents, reports a strategy s i in
Note that S i = Θ i for the direct mechanisms in the classical setting, but may be arbitrary in general.
Knightian undominated strategies. Given a mechanism M , a pure strategy s i of a player i with a candidate set K i is (weakly) undominated, in symbols s i ∈ UD i (K i ), if i does not have another (possibly mixed) strategy σ i such that
If K is a product or a profile of candidate sets, that is, if K = (K 1 , . . . , K n ) or
Note that the above notion of an undominated strategy is a natural extension of its classical counterpart, but other extensions are possible.
Weakly dominant-strategy truthfulness in classical settings. Finally, let us recall what it means for a mechanism M to be weakly dominant-strategy truthful (weakly DST) when every player i knows θ * i exactly. Namely, for each player i:
(For comparison, the notion of a DST mechanism omits the last condition above.)
Result
We prove the Knightian robustness of many mechanisms at once as follows.
Theorem 1. Let M be a weakly dominant-strategy truthful mechanism for classical single-parameter domains. Then, in this domain with Knightian valuation uncertainty, for every player i,
Discussion. The above theorem implies that the behavior of (weakly dominantstrategy truthful) mechanisms in a δ-approximate single-parameter domains gracefully degrades with δ. In particular, it implies that, when applied to the provision of a public good in the presence of n Knightian players, the VCG mechanism guarantees, in undominated strategies, a social welfare ≥ MSW − 2nδ. As another example, when applied to buying paths in a network, the VCG mechanism guarantees a social welfare ≥ MSW − 2mδ, where m is the number of edges in the network. Finally, we note that the proof of Theorem 1 easily extends to imply an analogous result for the VCG mechanism for single-minded combinatorial auctions, which are not quite single-parameter domains. 'the outcome M (v) is sufficiently good whenever max i |v i − θ * i | is sufficiently small for all i and θ * i ∈ K i '.
3 In such an auction, there are m distinct goods, and each player i values, positively and for the same amount θ * i , only the supersets of a given subset S i of the goods. This auction is not singleparameter because S i is private, that is, known solely to i. Accordingly, i's true valuation can be fully described only by the number θ * i and the subset S i . The VCG mechanism for single-minded auctions ensures, in undominated strategies, a social welfare that is at least MSW − 2 min{n, m}δ.
Proof. The theorem is obvious when K i = {θ * i } is a singleton: since reporting the truth is a weakly dominant strategy, it dominates all other strategies so that UD(K i ) = {θ * i } must also be a singleton. For the rest of the proof we assume that K i has at least two distinct valuations.
We begin by recalling the following fact about dominant-strategy truthful mechanisms in single-parameter domains where each player perfectly knows his own true
Let M be a mechanism for a single-parameter domain, and let f i (v) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the allocation chosen by M , under strategy profile v, is in player i's set S i . Then, M is dominant-strategy truthful if and only if
Having recalled the above fact, we now prove that, for any Knightian player i with 
Now note that θ i ∈ K i implies that θ i − v
Moreover, by the monotonicity of f , whenever z ≥ v i , it holds that f i (z, v −i ) ≥ f i (v). Therefore we deduce that the above difference is greater than or equal to zero. We conclude that reporting v ⊥ i is no worse than reporting v i . Next there are two subcases. If E U i θ i , M (v ⊥ ) − E U i θ i , M (v) equals to
